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Chapter pages in book: (p. 1 - 3)CANADA, like the United States, is a federation. Its people are
not homogenous in ethnic origins, in economic interests, in tradi-
tions, or in social outlook, and this heterogeneity stands in the
way of governmental centralization. In addition, constitutional
provisions divide functions and revenues between the Dominion
and the provinces. Extension of federal functions, if no constitu-
tional bars existed, would be difficult because what appeals to
Nova Scotia may not appeal to Ontario; what is satisfactory to
Alberta may be unsatisfactory to Quebec. Yet changing. condi-
tions and shifts in economic and social philosophy demand some
adjustments in Dominion-provincial functions and revenues)-
The federal structure is protected in Canada, as in the United
States, by constitutional provisions, yet, as far as words go, the
Dominion appears to have much more extensive powers. This
appearance of power is illusory, but the basis for it goes back to
the circumstances under which the British North America Act
was written.
Deliberating in the shadow of the American Civil War, the
fathers of confederation meant to establish a strong central
government. In the British North America Act, for example,
the Dominion government is given the power to disallow pro-
vincial legislation and in the early decades the power was used
freely.2 Section 91 gives the Dominion power "to make laws
for the peace, order and good government of Canada" about
all matters "not assigned exclusively to the legislatures of the
provinces". But "for greater certainty" twenty-nine subjects are
specified.In Section 92 the powers oftheprovincesare
enumerated under sixteen heads, of which the thirteenth is "prop-
erty and civil rights in the province". While in all these examples,
Dominion power would appear to be great, it has in fact been
whittled away by provincial pertinacity, by the force of events,
and by court decisions. In Canada no less than in the United
1Theaccount given here of developments before 1941ismainly a paraphrase of
my article, Canadian Dominion-Provincial Financial Relations, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, August 1942.
From 1924 to 1936 the power was in abeyance and some thought it had become
obsolete. Since then, however, it has been used against several Alberta statutes.States, the constitution is what the judges say itis, and the
judges then making the final decisions for Canada were the
members of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council sitting
atWestminster. The distributionof powers betweenthe
Dominion and the provinces came to be little different from that
in the United States but very different from the centralized
federalism envisaged in 1867. The general residuary powers of
the Dominion shriveled up and the twenty-nine heads of Section
91 became almost the sole sources of Dominion power. Mean-
while provincial powers with respect to property and civil rights
expanded.3 Unemployment insurance, hours of labor, minimum
wages, and the like fell in the provincial sphere; yet, in recent
years, national action about them has seemed imperative.
It would be an error, however, to emphasize too strongly the
influence of the Privy Council. The domineering pretensions of
the Dominion were challenged in the 1880's by a genuine and
deep-rooted agitation for "provincial rights". A large section of
public opinion was insistent upon some restriction of Dominion
power and the inherent federal character of Canada found ex-
pression. Moreover,itshould be remembered that no rigid
division of constitutional authority would long be satisfactory in
a federal state. Economic and social relationships "stubbornly
refuse to be compartmentalized. As a result, the different govern-
ments come across one another's paths in a way that was never
expected at the time of Confederation."4
Thus there is a curious historical-constitutional difference be-
tween Canada and the United States. In the former the framers
of the federal government had a unitary bias; in the latter, they
did not. Opponents of centralization can, therefore, make a
3 "There is much truth, as well as some exaggeration, in the contention that the
and civil rights' clause has become the real residuary clause of the con-
stitution." Report of tile Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I
(King's Printer, Ottawa, 1940), p. 247.
4 J. A. Corry, The Gro'wt/, of Government Activities Since Confederation (King's
Printer, Ottawa, 1939), p. 6. The Canadian constitution has no provision for amend-
ment, and in recent years a sharp debate has been carried on concerning the proper
procedure. At one extreme is the view, presented by Quebec, that the British North
America Act is a compact, amendable only with the consent of all the provinces.
Historical evidence in support of this position is unimpressive and the handicap it
imposes upon effective statesmanship is serious. Opinion has not, however1 crystalized
around any more reasonable scheme.
2more effective appeal to history in the United States, although
the usefulness of this appeal may be doubted for two reasons.
First, the broad trend of intergovernmental relations has been
markedly similar in the two countries. Second, discovery of the
intentions of the wise men who deliberated at Philadelphia in
1787 and at Quebec in 1864 provides little direct guidance in
the solution of today's problems. At present the demand is for
a social service state; eighty or one hundred and sixty years ago
the sphere of government was narrowly viewed. This is not a
criticism of the framers of the constitutions of either country.
These men were neither prophets nor soothsayers. The proof of
their wisdom is that the constitutions they wrote have been flex-
ible enough to survive a revolution in economic and social
philosophy.
THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON DoMINION-
PROVINCIAL RELATIONS
The regional diversity of Canada is not as obvious or as marked
as that of the United States, principally because Canada has no
such variety of climatic conditions. "Economically Canada can
be compared to a string of beads, and they are not all pearls."5
More than nine out of every ten Canadians live in a discon-
tinuous belt of land, two hundred miles wide, along the Amer-
ican border.6 The Appalachians separate the maritime provinces
from Quebec; a vast V-shaped area of ancient rocks surrounding
Hudson Bay —theCanadian shield —separatesthe prairie
provinces from Ontario; the Rockies separate British Columbia
from the prairie provinces.
The ruinous incidence of the depression of the early 'thirties
upon the prairie provinces, and therefore upon the finances of
the provincial governments, was the occasion for the appoint-
ment of a Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations
in August 1937. It was to investigate the distribution of func-
tions and revenues between the Dominion and the provinces,
"and to express what in its opinion, subject to the retention of
the distribution of legislative powers essential to a proper carry-
5Reportof the Royal Commission on Dominion-Provincial Relations, Book I, p. 186.
F. R. Scott, CanadaToday(Oxford University Press, 1939), p. 5.
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